By Julian Dodd
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Additional resources for An Identity Theory of Truth
P. 266) But what are we to make of this? The small grain of truth in Frege’s account of indirect speech is its ontological commitment to propositions. And, as we shall see in Chapter 3, Frege (and Dummett) are right to view propositions as thoughts. , p. 265) of an utterance made by the subject of the report, and hence right to suppose that an utterer of (1) talks about a thought. But we can accept this without going down the road of supposing that it is the content-sentence, embedded within a ‘that’-clause, which refers to a thought, and hence without holding that its constituent expressions refer to senses.
Suppose, for example, that Susan asserts the principle of bivalence, and Eleanor replies by saying ‘that is entailed by the equivalence thesis’. Given that it is propositions which may enter into entailment relations, one can hardly hold back from saying that, in this case, the demonstrative ‘that’ names a proposition. And if this is so, why should we not treat another possible response of Eleanor’s to Susan’s assertion – namely, ‘that is true’ – in the same way? In reply to this kind of objection, the strategy of Grover et al.
First, according to an appealing way of characterizing necessity, necessary truths are true irrespective of how the world is, and hence do not need something in the world to exist in order for them to be true. ) Furthermore, on the standard account of entailment a necessary truth is entailed by anything, and so any entity will be able to serve as a necessary truth’s truthmaker. Unless an alternative account of entailment is available, this counterintuitive result is a sign that necessary truths do not have truthmakers.
An Identity Theory of Truth by Julian Dodd